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JUSTICE AS A KIND OF IMPARTIALITY 
Kai NIELSEN 
RÉSUMÉ: Les approches kantiennes de la justice conçoivent celle-ci comme impartialité, les 
approches hobbesiennes la conçoivent comme avantage mutuel. Uarticle montre que ces concep-
tions ne sont pas rivales, mais que la justice en est venue à signifier la prise en compte égale 
des intérêts légitimes de tous : chaque homme étant considéré comme l'égal moral de chaque 
autre. Tel est l'aboutissement de la justice conçue comme impartialité. Les théories de l'avantage 
mutuel, en revanche, ne disent pas ce qu'est la justice ou ce quelle est devenue, mais fournissent 
des raisons prudentielles pour agir de manière juste, dans la mesure où une telle conduite est 
profitable. 
SUMMARY : Kantian conceptions of justice construe justice as impartiality, Hobbesian ones construe 
justice as mutual advantage. It is argued that these are not rival conceptions, but that justice 
has become the equal consideration of the legitimate interests of everyone alike : where all 
persons are treated as equals, as persons of equal moral standing. That is what justice as 
impartiality comes to. Mutual advantage theories, by contrast, do not tell us what justice is, 
or has become, but give us prudential reasons for being just by showing that, generally speaking, 
doing what just people do pays. 
I 
U T s Justice impartiality or mutual advantage ?" may not be a well-formed question. 
Al t may be neither or both. It may instead be fair reciprocity, what would be 
agreed to in an ideal bargaining situation, how conflicts of interest are adjudicated 
under conditions of undistorted discourse or something significantly different. The 
fact of the matter is that justice cannot be reduced to any of these or indeed to anything 
else for familiar Butlerian-Moorean reasons. But such anti-reductionism does not 
preclude a central component of justice being one or another of these things. I shall 
argue that justice is properly viewed as a kind of impartiality, namely, that justice 
requires the equal consideration of the legitimate interests of everyone alike. And, it 
could be equally said, as the previous sentence reveals, that justice is a kind of equality. 
Justice as mutual advantage by contrast is not a different conception of justice 
yielding different principles of justice but something — or so I shall argue — that 
could not be justice at all and justice as fair reciprocity suffers a similar fate for where 
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it is not so indeterminate as to be problematical it reduces to justice as mutual advantage. 
Appeals to mutual advantage will not show what justice is or what the principles of 
justice should be but can at best provide a rational amoralist with a motive for reasoning 
and acting in accordance with the dictates of justice. Even here rational self-interested 
people might not be persons of moral principle. Rationality permits justice but does 
not require it. Solving the problem of compliance does not show what justice is or 
what its principles should be. Indeed it should not have the position of importance it 
now often has in discussions of justice, but should be relegated to a problem of little 
theoretical normative interest about how children are to be socialized. Properly unders-
tood, as W. D. Falk put it years ago, it is a problem of goading not of guiding. • An 
individual can be rational through and through and still, for all of that, not be a person 
of moral principle though, without Gyges ring, as Kant agreed with Hobbes in stressing, 
he will, as things can be expected to stand, have to be, if he is sensible, a man of 
good morals, though particularly where he is in a situation of very considerable and 
stable power this will give him lots of lebensraum. So much so that he may take 
himself out of morality altogether, except as something to manipulatively use to serve 
his own interests, or the interests of his class or clan. 
II 
Enough of grand proclaiming and the uttering of dark sayings, I shall now turn 
to the business of providing arguments placed in something of a narrative. For theories 
mainly concerned with justice as a property of basic social institutions, there have 
been two quite different stresses. One stress, as in John Rawls and Brian Barry, to 
cite its major contemporary representatives, is that the function of justice is to provide 
a reasonable basis for agreement among people who seek to take due account of the 
interests of all ; the other stress, as in neo-Hobbesians such as David Gauthier and 
James Buchanan, sees the function of justice as the construction of social devices 
which enable people who are essentially egoists to get along better with one another 
while doing the best they can for themselves.2 The first conceives of justice as impar-
tiality, the second as mutual advantage. Both accounts in their most powerful contem-
porary formulations are in some sense constructivist accounts not relying on moral 
realist beliefs of either an intuitionist or naturalist sort in which moral truths are 
discovered as articulating some antecedent reality not dependent on human construc-
tion. Constructivist accounts, as with Gauthier, reject such meta-ethical claims or, as 
with Rawls, do not rely on such claims (meta-ethical claims rejecting other sorts of 
1. W.D. FALK, Ought, Reasons, and Morality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 42-66. 
2. John RAWLS: A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); "Kantian Construc-
tivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy LXXVII, 9 (Sep 1980), 515-572; "The Basic Liberties 
and Their Priority" in Sterling M. MCMURRIN, éd.. Liberty, Equality and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 3-87; and "Social Unity and Primary Goods" in Amartya SEN and Bernard 
WILLIAMS, eds.. Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 159-186. 
Brian Barry, Theories of Justice : A Treatise on Social Justice, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA : University of California 
Press, 1989). David GAUTHIER, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). David GAUTHIER, 
Moral Dealing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). James BUCHANAN. The Limits of Liberty : 
Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975). 
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meta-ethical claims) but proceed in a contractarian manner by selecting criteria for 
the correct principles of justice or for just social practices, that would be agreed on 
in some suitable hypothetical situation or what would actually be agreed on when 
reasoning under certain constraints and in conditions of undistorted discourse.3 Both 
accounts are contractarian and both constructivist. (A contractarian constructivist is 
not a redundancy.) What Gauthier rejects Rawls more prudently sets aside as unne-
cessary for the articulation of a theory of justice. He travels, as he puts it himself, 
metaphysically, and indeed philosophically, light. (This seems to me, as it has not 
seemed to some others, is a not inconsiderable virtue.)4 
Historically speaking, the tradition, conceiving of justice as impartiality, has a 
broadly Kantian source and that of conceiving of justice as mutual advantage has a 
Hobbesian source. Brian Barry, Will Kymlicka and Allen Buchanan have recently 
powerfully argued that these two traditions are in conflict and are in a conflict of such 
a sort that they cannot be reconciled.5 Barry and Kymlicka, but not Buchanan, further 
argue that in much contemporary theorizing about justice, including most importantly 
that of John Rawls, these two at least seemingly incompatible traditions are mixed 
together in ways that will not withstand critical scrutiny. We cannot, they argue, have 
it both ways as Rawls, and Hume as well, in effect believe. These conceptions and 
traditions are in conflict and they cannot be so juggled as to be coherently combined. 
The correct move, Barry, Kymlicka and Allen Buchanan all agree, is to reject the 
Hobbesian mutual advantage tradition. The way to go is to accept and clarify the 
tradition stressing that justice is the impartial consideration of all the interests of 
everyone. Here they have as an ally Jeffrey Reiman, though he puts the matter somewhat 
differently.6 
Influential formulations of both accounts, as is seen paradigmatically in the work 
of Rawls and Gauthier, share the belief, a belief also held by Habermas and Reiman, 
that justice is what everyone could in principle reach a rational agreement on. This, 
of course, is standardly taken as being partially definitive of social contract theories : 
whether bargaining-theory contractarianism à la Gauthier or moral contractarianism 
3. The phrase "undistorted discourse" is, of course, from Jiirgen Habermas. Rawls, with his veil of ignorance 
and original position, restricts discourse while Habermas's model of undistorted discourse requires full 
information. But Rawls's account in normative domains aims as well, though in a way quite different from 
Habermas, at undistorted discourse by eliminating, with the veil of ignorance, morally irrelevant factors 
that would impede impartial assessment. 
4. See centrally here John RAWLS, "Justice as Fairness : Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public-
Affairs 14, 3 (Summer 1985), 223-251. But also see relatedly his "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7, 1 (1987), 1-23; his "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping 
Consensus," New York University Law Review 64, 2 (May 1989), 233-255 ; and his "The Priority of Right 
and Ideas of Good," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17,4 (Fall 1988), 251-275. Rawls's fundamental approach 
in these essays is challenged by Jean HAMPTON, "Should Political Philosophy be Done Without Meta-
physics?" Ethics 99, 4 (1989), 791-814; Joseph RAZ, "Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Absti-
nence," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, 1 (1990), 3-46; and defended by Kai NIELSEN, "Rawls and the 
Socratic Ideal," Analyse & Kritik 13, 1 (1991), 69-73. 
5. BARRY, Theories of Justice; Will KYMLICKA, "TWO Theories of Justice," Inquiry 33 (1990), 99-119; and 
Allen BUCHANAN, "Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 
19, 3 (Summer 1990), 227-252. 
6. Jeffrey REIMAN, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 
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à la Rawls, Barry and Reiman. However, the justice as impartiality view and the 
mutual advantage view have, of course, a different conception of why people are 
trying to reach agreement. Indeed, when we see what these conceptions are, with 
their differing rationales, we will recognize that they are set in very different theories. 
The mutual advantage view says that the motive for justice is the pursuit of individual 
advantage. People in societies such as ours pursue justice, neo-Hobbesians claim, for 
mutual advantage. More generally, they will do so in what Hume and Rawls call the 
circumstances of justice, namely, circumstances of limited material resources, confined 
generosity, and conflicting interests or goals. In the circumstances of justice, which 
are the actual conditions of human life or at least most human life, people, the claim 
goes, can expect to advance their interests most efficiently through cooperating with 
other members of society, rather than living with them in conditions of conflict. Rational 
people on such a view will agree on certain constraints — say, the ones Gauthier 
specifies — as the minimum price that has to be paid in order to obtain the cooperation 
of others. 
By contrast the motive for behaving justly on the justice as impartiality view is 
not reducible to even a sophisticated and indirect self-interest. Rather, the correct 
motive for behaving justly, on that view, is the belief that what happens to other people 
matters in and of itself. This being so people should not look at things from their own 
point of view alone but should seek to find a basis for agreement that is acceptable 
from all points of view.7 People, as Rawls puts it in a Kantian vein, are all self-
originating sources of valid claims. We accept their claims because we think their 
interests are as important as our own and indeed that their interests, whoever they 
are, are all equally important. The life of everyone, no matter how mentally enfeebled, 
matters and matters equally. We do not just, or perhaps even at all, take their interests 
into account because we are trying to promote or at least protect our own interests. 
For the impartiality approach, at least on some of its formulations, justice would be 
the content of an agreement that would be reached under conditions that do not allow 
for bargaining power to be translated into advantage. By contrast, on the mutual 
advantage theory, justice can obtain even when people make agreements that are 
obtained by bargaining under conditions where the bargainers stand in differential 
power relations and have differential bargaining power. Indeed, where people are so 
differentially situated, any agreement they come to for mutual advantage must reflect 
that fact. Such an approach is inescapable if appeal to self-interest is the motive for 
behaving justly. "If," as Barry puts it in characterizing that position, "the terms of 
agreement failed to reflect differential bargaining power, those whose power was 
disproportionate to their share under the agreement would have an incentive to seek 
to upset it."8 They would have no sufficient reason, on that account, for sticking with 
the agreement. By contrast, the impartiality approach uncouples justice from bar-
gaining power, since it does not require that everyone find it in her advantage to be 
just. They can have good reasons for being just even when being just is neither in 
their short run nor their long run advantage. That the powerful have an incentive to 
7. KYMLICKA, "Two Theories of Justice," 100. 
8. BARRY, Theories of Justice, 250. 
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upset agreements they would enter into in such circumstances with the weak is a 
morally irrelevant reason for their not sticking with their agreements. From the moral 
point of view it cannot even be considered. 
Given this difference in orientation, the kind of agreements that could even count 
as just agreements for the impartialist do not allow bargaining power to be translated 
into advantage. Indeed, they specifically prohibit it. Barry, Kymlicka and Allen Bucha-
nan all argue that the mutual advantage approach does not even count as a theory of 
justice. While the mutual advantage approach may generate some basic principles of 
social cooperation and coordination, these will not always yield just agreements, since 
they allow as "just agreements" agreements obtained in situations where the power 
people have is very different, undeserved, and exerted. The resulting system of coo-
peration with its resulting system of rights and duties lacks one of the basic properties 
of a moral system, namely, the property of giving equal weight to the interests of all 
the parties to the agreement. So while it articulates a system of social cooperation it 
is not a moral theory and thus it is not a theory or an account of justice. 
On the mutual advantage account some persons can fall outside the system of 
rights, at least as normally understood, altogether. In contrast with the Kantian impar-
tiality approach, those without bargaining power will fall beyond the pale of morality. 
Not every individual will have an inherent moral status. Some, on such an account, 
can be treated as a means only. This would be true of young children, of the severely 
retarded, of the utterly powerless, and it would be true of future generations (if they 
are to be spoken of as persons at all). All these people lack bargaining power for they 
have no way of retaliating against those people who harm them or fail to take into 
consideration their well being. They thus on such an account lack moral standing ; 
they can have no rights and we have no duties or obligations to them, though we can 
rightly treat them kindly if we so choose. 
Those are the extreme cases but sometimes at least the powerful in our class 
divided and stratified societies can with impunity treat the weak without moral concern. 
They can exploit them and push them against the wall. Where the dominant class is 
very secure, as for a time it sometimes is, it can rationally proceed in this way knowing 
that the dominated class has no effective means of fighting back. If indeed some gain 
an irresistible, effectively unchallengeable power, then they have with such power, on 
Hobbes's account, as well as for contemporary Hobbesians, something which "justifieth 
all actions really and properly in whomsoever it is found."9 But in a world so ordered 
the constraints of justice would have no place. We could have perhaps (given the 
circumstances) a rational system of cooperation and coordination. But we would not 
have a morality. There is no reasoning here in accordance with the moral point of 
view. Where the strong can and do enslave or exploit the weak to the advantage of 
the strong we have something which is paradigmatically unjust. Barry puts the point 
thus: 
9. Thomas Hobbes as quoted in Patrick RILEY, Will and Political Legitimacy : A Critical Exposition of Social 
Contract Theories in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hegel (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 
1982), 39. 
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This gives us the defining characteristic of the second approach [the impartiality approach], 
namely, that justice should be the content of an agreement that would be reached by rational 
people under conditions that do not allow for bargaining power to be translated into 
advantage.10 
Mutual advantage theory perhaps provides a good analysis of what genuinely rational 
purely self-interested people would do if they were well-informed. If we are going to 
intelligently engage in amoral realpolitik this is perhaps how we should proceed but 
it does not provide us with anything that even looks like a method of moral justification. 
A cluster of practices which could be correctly characterized as just practices could 
not be a set of practices which would sustain or even allow those with greater bargaining 
power to turn it into such an advantageous outcome for them that the weak could be 
killed, come to die of starvation or live in intolerable conditions of life when that 
could be avoided. Such practices are paradigmatically unjust practices. If they are not 
unjust then nothing is. 
A mutual advantage theorist might respond that his theory could never allow those 
things to obtain, for no matter how severe the power differentials, such driving of a 
hard bargain (as a matter of fact) would never be to the mutual advantage of the 
parties (neither the weak nor the strong). But to so respond is clearly to rely on a 
rather chancy empirical claim.11 Faced, under severe and relatively secure power 
differentials, with the possibility of starvation, the weak might rationally settle for 
subsistence wages. Faced with a very marginal subsistence living, families might find 
it to their advantage (including the children's advantage) to opt for child labor under 
harsh conditions. With one's back against the wall, one might even find it to one's 
advantage to sell oneself into slavery or to agree to play a kind of Russian roulette 
where one might be killed. It is itself a rather chancy empirical claim to say that such 
uses of power would never be in the advantage of people in positions of power because 
the likelihood of relying on the weak sticking with such harshly driven bargains would 
be too risky. That this would be so in all, or perhaps even in most, realistic conditions 
is far from evident. We can hardly be very confident that positions of power might 
not for a considerable time be so secure that it would not be to the advantage of the 
powerful to drive such hard bargains. But whatever is in fact the case here about 
mutual advantage, we can know, impartiality theorists claim, that such bargains are 
unjust. Even if they do turn out to be mutually advantageous, given the circumstances 
people are in, they remain morally unacceptable. If, to summarize, they are not mutually 
advantageous they are wrong on both accounts. If they turn out, after all, to be 
mutually advantageous, they are still wrong, mutual advantage theory to the contrary 
not withstanding. It allows, as we have seen, as an open moral option, if consistently 
applied, at least the possibility of things obtaining which are grossly immoral if 
anything is. 
10. BARRY, Theories of Justice, 302. 
11. This is reminiscent of utilitarian arguments to ward off reductio arguments against utilitarianism. 
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III 
Let us now consider impartiality theories. They take several forms but whether 
or not they require the postulation of an original position or a state of nature or anything 
of that sort such theories view moral reasoning not as a form of bargaining but as a 
deliberation concerning what is to be done between agents who share a commitment 
to impartiality, to the giving of equal weight to the interests and needs of all. Put 
differently, moral agents are people who are deliberating about which principles should 
be acceptable to all points of view. That, Barry has it, is the basic idea of impartiality. 
Impartiality theorists such as Rawls, Hare, Nagel, Reiman, Barry, Scanlon and Dworkin 
disagree over which principles of social justice are to be adopted but they all are 
egalitarians and argue (pace F. H. Hayek) that justice as impartiality requires (where 
possible) the elimination of or neutralization of morally arbitrary inequalities, namely 
those inequalities arising from differences in social circumstances or natural talents. 
How fundamentally such an approach differs from the mutual advantage approach can 
be seen from the fact that an underlying rationale for appealing to impartial agreement 
is that it substitutes a moral equality for a physical inequality. As Kymlicka well puts 
it, the two views are, morally speaking, a world apart. "From the point of view of 
everyday morality, mutual advantage is an alternative to justice, not an alternative 
account of justice."12 
However, appealing here to everyday morality, and not to something more abstract 
such as the moral point of view, begs the question with mutual advantage theorists, 
for they are willing to jettison much of everyday morality for a streamlined morality 
they regard (correctly or incorrectly) as more rational. There are on Hobbesian accounts 
no natural duties to others, no real moral difference between right and wrong, which 
all persons must respect. There is, as well, no moral equality underlying our physical 
inequality. All these notions are illusions generating bits of moral ideology. To the 
liberal appeal to moral equality (the life of everyone matters and matters equally) the 
Hobbesian can ask (as James Buchanan does), "Why care about moral equality?"13 
(I think, as I shall argue in the last section, this comes to asking "Why care about 
morality ?") 
Hobbesians, to continue the mutual advantage theorist's counter to impartiality 
theory, will argue that impartialists do not push questions of justification to a deep 
enough level. They do not realize that a person only has a reason to do something if 
the action the person contemplates doing satisfies some desire of that person or answers 
to her interests, so that if something's being just is to count as a good reason for doing 
it, justice must be shown to be in the interest of the agent.14 Keeping this in mind 
we frame the Hobbesian question : why should people possessing unequal power or 
intelligence refrain from using it in their own interests ? 
12. KYMLICKA, "Two Theories of Justice," 103. 
13. James BUCHANAN, The Limits of Liberty : Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 54. See also David GAUTHIER, 
Morals by Agreement, 55-58. 
14. BARRY, Theories of Justice, 363. 
517 
KAI NIELSEN 
To this the impartialist can in turn respond in good Kantian fashion that morality 
needs no external justification. Morality itself provides a sufficient and original source 
of determination within us that is no more and no less artificial than the Hobbesian 
self-interested motivation. People can be motivated to act morally simply by coming 
to appreciate the moral reasons for doing so. 
Hobbesians with their instrumentalist conception of rationality will find this impar-
tialist acceptance here artificial and perhaps even evasive. Indeed they may even regard 
it as irrational. But they in turn must face Barry's claim that to equate rationality with 
the efficient pursuit of self-interest is a view which rests on pure assertion. Rational 
egoism is not an inconsistent view. There is {pace Alan Gewirth) no showing that to 
be consistent one must be an impartialist. But there is also no good reason to believe 
that the very meaning of "rational" is such that if one is rational one must be an 
egoist or a constrained maximizer. The acceptance of the formal criterion of univer-
salizability together with a recognition that others are fundamentally like us in having 
needs and goals and indeed in having, generally speaking, some of the same needs 
and goals, gives us powerful, though not utterly decisive, reasons for accepting the 
claims of an impartial morality.15 A person is not being inconsistent if he does not 
care about the needs and goals of others ; he does not violate the criterion of uni-
versalizability, but, as Barry puts it, "the virtually unanimous concurrence of the 
human race in caring about the defensibility of actions in a way that does not simply 
appeal to power" suggests that this appeal to impartiality and to moral equality is a 
very deeply embedded considered conviction to some extent held across cultures and 
over time.16 It also can be put into wide reflective equilibrium. To say that such persons 
act irrationally if so acxing is not in their individual self-interest is to utilize what is 
in effect an arbitrary persuasive definition of what it is to be rational. 
Gauthier au contraire assumes that the "prudent pursuit of one's own ends is 
obviously rational, concern for the impartial justifiability of one's actions is not."17 
But how, if at all, is Gauthier's belief to be established? Some reflective and well-
informed persons (Henry Sidgwick among others) think both concerns are rational. 
How is Gauthier to show that they are mistaken ? How can Gauthier, or anyone else, 
show that only a prudent pursuit of one's own ends is rational or even that it is a 
rational motive for action that always overrides for a rational person other motives 
for action ? Gauthier 's view appears at least, as I quoted Barry remarking, to rest on 
pure assertion. But, given that is all that Gauthier 's claim about what is rational and 
irrational has going for it, it "can therefore fitly be opposed by a counter-assertion, 
namely, that it is equally rational to care about what can be defended impartially."18 
Barry then goes on to add, though, "I do not know how to prove that the term 
'rationality' is appropriately employed in this way ; I think that the virtual unanimous 
15. Ibid., 273 and 285. To say that something is universalizable is to say that if x is good for y or is something 
y ought to do, it is something that is good for anyone else or something anyone else ought to do if that 
someone is relevantly like y and is relevantly similarly situated. "Relevantly" here needs to be cashed in 
contextually. NIELSEN, "Justice, Equality and Needs," Dalhousie Review 69, 2 (Summer 1989), 211-227. 
16. BARRY, Theories of Justice, 285. 
17. Ibid., 285. 
18. Ibid. 
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concurrence of the human race in caring about the defensibility of actions in a way 
that does not appeal to power is a highly relevant supporting consideration."19 Perhaps 
almost all the human race is irrational in believing that, and only a few Hobbesians, 
identifying rationality with a prudent pursuit of self-interest, have a sane view on such 
matters, "but until somebody produces more than an argument by definitional fiat for 
the equation of rationality and self-interest we can safely continue to deny it."20 
We, in fine, have no sound argument to justify believing that it is inconsistent 
with reason not to put, in either the short term or the long term, one's informed self-
interest first.21 A person who puts her own interests first can be acting rationally, but 
so can the person who acts on principles that can withstand impartial appraisal when 
the interests of all people affected (including herself) are given equal weight.22 Reason 
does not require that we act according to principles that all can reasonably accept but 
in so acting a person's actions are as much in accord with reason as those of a person 
who acts out of self-interest. A person in acting either way need make no deductive 
or inductive mistake, need not be conceptually confused, lack a firm grasp of the 
facts or not have the ability to hold firmly in mind the relevant considerations, including 
the relevant arguments. The Hobbesian who claims that it is either irrational, or even 
less than fully rational, to be an impartialist is just arm-waving. 
IV 
All constructivist contractarian theories of justice, and of morality more generally, 
whether mutual advantage theories or impartiality theories, construe justice as those 
principles and that set of practices on which everyone at least in principle could reach 
agreement.23 Barry and Reiman as much as Rawls construes justice as impartiality 
in terms of agreement. But there are those, myself included, who are justice-as-
impartiality advocates but reject construing justice in terms of agreement. Barry gives 
us a sense of what the stress on agreement would come to. 
[T]he function of justice is to provide a rational basis for agreement among people who 
do not simply look at things from the point of view of their own interests but seek to take 
due account of the interests of all. Justice, on this conception, is what can be justified to 
everyone... It is inherent in this conception that there is a distinctively moral motive, 
namely, the desire to behave in accordance with principles that can be defended to oneself 
and others in an impartial way.24 
Following Thomas Scanlon, Barry takes the underlying moral motive to be "the desire 
to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., 303. 
22. KYMLICKA, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) and "Two Theories of 
Justice." 
23. BARRY, Theories of Justice, 272. 
24. Ibid. 
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reject."25 Conceptions of this sort are widely held, but Kymlicka among others thinks 
that they are, that notwithstanding, fundamentally mistaken.26 Perhaps such a concep-
tion would work if we were only considering moral relations between competent adults. 
But there are, as well, moral relations between competent adults and children, mental 
defectives, and other sentient creatures as well. It is senseless to talk about impartial 
agreement with infants or mental defectives, to say nothing of animals ; it is senseless 
to speak of giving them grounds they could not reasonably reject. Considerations of 
justice are very stringent between us (assuming we are competent adults) and the 
severely mentally retarded, but there is no room for talk of justice coming to what 
they and we could come to an agreement about. 
If someone is incapable of being a party to an agreement with us, that certainly does not 
mean we lack any moral motive for attending to his or her interests ? The emphasis on 
agreement within impartiality seems to create some of the same problems that the emphasis 
on bargaining power creates within mutual advantage theories : some people will fall 
beyond the pale of morality, including those who are most in need of moral protection.27 
It is a mistake to claim, as Scanlon does, that morality only applies to a being if the 
notion of justification to a being of that kind makes sense.28 
Scanlon maintains in defense of his thesis that that a being can feel pain shows 
that that being has a center of consciousness and, because of this, that the notion of 
justification to such a being makes sense. It is because of this, Scanlon claims, that 
pain is so often taken as a relevant criterion for moral status. But it is false that if a 
being can feel pain justification can be addressed to that being and that we can in 
principle at least attain agreement with him. Agreement requires the being not just 
be able to feel pain, and to be a center of consciousness, but comprehension as well 
and while infants, severe mental defectives, and many animals can feel pain they 
cannot comprehend things so that they could enter into agreements with us such that 
the notion of justification could even make sense to them. Yet surely they have moral 
status. That we cannot address justification to a baby does not mean the baby lacks 
moral status. We give moral status to an infant or to a dog not because we can address 
justification to it or to its moral trustee. We give moral status to it because it can 
suffer or flourish, because the lives of such beings "can go better or worse, and 
because we think their well-being is of intrinsic importance."29 Some beings we can 
address justification to and some we cannot, what "makes them all moral beings is 
the fact that they have a good, and their well-being matters intrinsically."30 But to so 
argue is to break altogether with the contractarian tradition, including its impartialist 
versions. But that would seem at least to be required of an adequate account of morality. 
25. Ibid., 284. 
26. KYMLICKA, "TWO Theories of Justice," 110-112. 
27. Ibid., 110. 
28. SCANLON, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in A. SEN and B. WILLIAMS, eds., Utilitarianism and 
Beyond, 113-114. Indeed, it is much the same mistake as mutual advantage theorists such as Gauthier 
make. 
29. KYMLICKA, "TWO Theories of Justice," 111. 
30. Ibid. 
520 
JUSTICE AS A KIND OF IMPARTIALITY 
Kymlicka argues that we should construe justice as impartiality not in the manner 
of the contractarian as based on some kind of agreement but that we should simply 
take impartiality as a criterion that, with or without agreement, gives all interests 
equal weight. Our moral motivation is not in reaching agreement but in responding 
to legitimate interests. We simply come to recognize, if we are moral beings, that 
others have legitimate claims to have their interests taken into account. The thing is 
to try to find or articulate principles of justice that give equal weight to everyone's 
interests. Agreement, Kymlicka claims, drops out at the most basic level. 
We have clear obligations to those who are powerless to defend or to represent 
or sometimes even to understand their own interests. In this vein, and abstracting a 
little, our clearest obligations are, Kymlicka claims, not to try to reach agreement but 
will involve taking people's interests into account and to the giving of equal weight 
to the interests of all human beings. This is the clear claim of justice as impartiality. 
Our principles of justice are justified when they do that. If they do not give such equal 
weight to the interests of all, whether we agree about these principles or not, this 
agreement does not justify them. This commits us to the substantively egalitarian 
view that the interests of all human beings matter and matter equally. Where that is 
not our guiding conception, we do not, at least on modern conceptions of justice, 
have justice. Agreement is, of course, Kymlicka acknowledges, of vital epistemological 
and political import. But at the foundational level, Kymlicka has it, it does not apply ; 
that is to say, it does not apply where we are saying what justice is and what the 
foundations of a just society are.31 "At the deepest level," Kymlicka continues, "justice 
is about equal consideration of our legitimate interests, and the many virtues of 
agreement are assessed by reference to that underlying idea, not vice versa."32 
V 
There is plainly something right about Kymlicka's argument here but there may 
be something wrong as well which, in some diminished way, gives morals by agreement 
another inning. What justice as impartiality substantively comes to is giving the 
interests of all equal weight such that everyone's interests matter and everyone's interests 
matter equally. Proper names or positions of prestige or power are not relevant in 
determining whose interests has pride of place when people have conflicting interests 
and both interests cannot be satisfied. Still, in such a situation we must depart from 
simple equality and it is there where the careful articulation of principles of social 
justice such as we find in Rawls, Scanlon, Reiman, and Barry becomes vital. But in 
making such a differential weighting, such as to proceed by benefiting the worst off 
maximally in ways that are compatible with retaining autonomy (including equal liberty 
for all) and fair equality of opportunity for all, we should start from a position where 
we give equal consideration to the interests of all and where we start by giving an 
initial equal weighting to all interests. It is, as Barry puts it, this baseline of equality 
31. Ibid., 113. 
32. Ibid., 112. 
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from which we must start when we reason morally. However, when we recognize that 
we are in a circumstance where not all interests can be satisfied equally, we look for 
impartial and fair ways of departing from simple equality. But these considerations 
do not gainsay the point that justice is about the equal consideration of our legitimate 
interests. This obtains whether or not there is anything that everyone competent to 
make such judgments and bent on being reasonable would agree on. So far things 
seem at least to continue to cut against contractarians. 
However, let us now ask how do we — or do we — know that this is what justice 
is and that this is what justice requires such that we must act in this way if we would 
be just and that for there to be just social institutions our social practices must be so 
structured ? It is here where agreement may come in by the back door. 
Kymlicka writes as if we could just somehow intuit or directly recognize that this 
is what justice is : that we could just "see" that these claims are true. But if there are 
any accounts which are by now widely recognized to be non-starters it is intuitionism 
(what Rawls calls rational intuitionism) and natural law theories where we in some 
mysterious way must just have direct access to the truth — indeed, even on some 
accounts, the certain truth — of some moral propositions. How then does Kymlicka 
know, and how can we know, that his fundamental substantive moral claims, claims 
not subject to agreement, are true or justified ? Perhaps they are — though Kymlicka 
does not claim that for them — conceptual claims such that we can know that they 
are true by having a grasp of the concept of justice, where to have a grasp of the 
concept of justice is to know how to use "justice" or cognate terms correctly. Perhaps 
the following conceptual chain holds : to be just is to be fair, to be fair is to be impartial 
and to be impartial is to give equal consideration to the interests of all human beings. 
If this is so, we could know the truth of Kymlicka's claims by coming to have a good 
understanding of the use of "justice." We would have what Simon Blackburn somewhat 
ironically calls Oxford Science.33 But even then there would have to be some agreement 
to even justifiably make that conceptual claim for there would have to be agreement 
that that is how we use "justice," that that is how we play such language-games.34 
But even so, even with such agreement, that may not at all give us a way of meeting 
mutual advantage theories. Gauthier, for example, perfectly well understands the 
ordinary use of "just" and "justice" and what it commits us to, if we would stick 
with it, but he will for his theoretical puiposes modify that use until it is comipatible 
with a set of principles which are — or so he believes — rationally sustainable when 
we reason carefully. We cannot go very far in sustaining substantive claims and 
substantive principles of justice through being clear about the use of "just" and allied 
terms. Such considerations may undermine certain absurd claims but they leave many 
competitors for what is just in the field. 
It may, that is, give us something like the first word but it will not carry us very 
far beyond that. But then how does Kymlicka know that his substantive claims about 
33. Simon BLACKBURN, "Can Philosophy Exist?" in Jocelyne COUTURE and Kai NIELSEN, eds., Metaphilo-
sophie : Reconstructing Philosophy. New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, AB : University of Calgary 
Press, 1994). 
34. Kai NIELSEN, "On there being Philosophical Knowledge," Theoria LV1, (1990), 193-225. 
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justice are justified ? He leaves this mysterious. Rawls, Daniels and Nielsen explicitly, 
and others implicitly, have in such contexts appealed to considered judgments or 
convictions in wide reflective equilibrium.35 It has been mistakenly thought that this 
is a thinly disguised form of intuitionism with all its difficulties plus even more evident 
worries about ethnocentrism. However, these charges are mistaken given the kind of 
coherentism involved in the appeal to considered judgments in wide reflective equi-
librium. It starts from our firmest considered convictions such as to enslave people 
is wrong, racial prejudice is evil, religious intolerance is unacceptable, and it tries to 
set out, if you will, a consistent cluster of such beliefs. But it also seeks to show how 
such specific considered convictions can be derived from, are explainable by, or at 
least are in accordance with, more general moral principles, some of which themselves 
may be considered judgments. "The interests of all human beings are of equal impor-
tance" is one such principle which is also such an abstract considered judgment in 
societies such as ours. We seek by a reciprocal adjusting of many elements, sometimes 
modifying or abandoning a specific considered judgment or sometimes modifying or 
even abandoning a more general principle or sometimes by coming to articulate a new 
one with a powerfully rationalizing power, until we get what we can recognize to be 
a consistent and coherent cluster of beliefs. We do this by sometimes trimming, 
sometimes expanding, our cluster of considered judgments and principles, but always 
adjusting this melange of convictions and beliefs. We do this, repeatedly seeking to 
maximize coherence, until we have something which we have good reasons to believe 
form a consistent and coherent cluster. So far we have nothing more than what an 
ethical intuitionist, though not only an ethical intuitionist, could affirm, though there 
need be, and indeed should be, no claim to a bizarre epistemic status or to a truth 
capturing power for the moral beliefs and principles. Indeed we can, and I believe 
should, following Rawls, avoid making any claim about the logical, epistemic or 
metaphysical status of our considered judgments, our principles of justice, or our other 
various moral claims. We should, to repeat, travel philosophically light.36 
Where wide reflective equilibrium clearly goes beyond ethical intuitionism, which 
only utilizes a narrow reflective equilibrium, is in its stress that other things besides 
specific moral beliefs and moral principles must be appealed to in gaining the coherent 
web of belief and conviction that would constitute a wide reflective equilibrium. The 
consistent set we seek is not only of specific moral convictions and more general 
principles but of whole theories of morality, conceptions of the function of morality 
in society, factual beliefs about the structure of society and about human nature, beliefs 
about social change (including beliefs about how societies will develop or can be made 
35. For discussions of reflective equilibrium see RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, 19-21, 48-51, 577-587 ; RAWLS, 
"The Independence of Moral Theory," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 
47 (1974/75), 7-10; Norman DANIELS, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," 
Journal of Philosophy 76 ( 1979) ; Kai NIELSEN, "Searching for an Emancipatory Perspective : Wide Reflec-
tive Equilibrium and the Hermeneutical Circle" in Evan SIMPSON, éd., Anti-foundationalism and Practical 
Reasoning (Edmonton, AB : Academic Printing and Publishing, 1987); and Kai NIELSEN, "In Defense of 
Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in Douglas ODEGARD, éd., Ethics and Justification (Edmonton, AB : Academic 
Printing and Publishing, 1988), 19-38, and Kai NIELSEN, "Philosophy Within the Limits of Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium Alone," lyyun (January 1994). 
36. John RAWLS, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," 223-251. 
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to develop) as well as specific historical and sociological beliefs about what our situation 
is. The equilibrium we seek is one in which all these elements are put into a coherent 
whole where the aim remains to maximize coherence. In narrow reflective equilibrium 
a specific considered conviction might be abandoned because it conflicted with many 
equally weighty specific considered convictions or a more general moral principle 
with considerable appeal. But in wide reflective equilibrium such a conviction might 
be rejected as well, or alternatively, because it was incompatible with some well 
established empirical facts about society or human beings or about our particular 
situation or made demands which, given what we know about the world, could not 
be realized or were beliefs which had moral alternatives which made much more sense 
in light of some carefully elaborated social or moral theories or theories about the 
function of morality in society. There are here a considerable range of considerations, 
including empirical considerations, that are relevant to our decisions about what to do 
or how to live. We normally start with relatively specific considered convictions but 
they are correctable by a whole range of empirical and theoretical convictions as well 
as by moral principles or moral theories, though sometimes, in the case of moral 
principles and theories, it will go the other way around and the principles or theories 
will be correctible by the specific considered judgments where just noting certain 
empirical facts may not be enough to undermine certain moral principles or theories. 
There is, in such a circumstance, the further consideration whether these non-moral 
facts (if that isn't pleonastic) are unalterable givens in our situation. There is the 
question of whether in this respect the world can be changed and whether, if it can, 
it should be changed. We need also to consider, in the widest sense of "cost," the 
cost of such a change. Maximizing coherence by means of such considerations yields 
a critical morality that does not have the dogmatism and, as Bertrand Russell noted, 
what in effect, though not in intention, is the conventionalism and subjectivism of 
ethical intuitionism. (Dogmatism and subjectivism combined is a really unappealing 
repast.) Moreover, that critical morality also functions as a guard against ethnocentrism. 
Some of the specific judgments we start with may be ethnocentric but by the time 
we have got them into wide reflective equilibrium the ethnocentrism will be winnowed 
out. This is itself plainly a form of objectivity and all the objectivity, at least in such 
domains, we need or are likely to be able to get. 
So if Kymlicka would avail himself of such a procedure he at least arguably would 
have a method for arguing for his fundamental claims of justice and he need not just 
assert them somehow taking them to be natural laws or basic intuitions recoverable 
on reflection. The method of wide reflective equilibrium could, of course, be used, 
as well, to argue against an account like Kymlicka's. Its advantage, whichever way it 
is used, is that we do not with it need to just assert or to rely on intuitions, but can 
appeal to a method that is very like methods used in science and in other domains. 
Moreover, it does not wildly depart from how we very often proceed in commonsense 
contexts when we have our feet planted firmly on the ground. 
However, in doing this Kymlicka would be implicitly appealing to some agreement, 
to some consensus, for it is our considered convictions that we seek to get into wide 
reflective equilibrium. This means we are in effect appealing to the convictions of a 
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spectrum of related specific peoples living in specific and related communities with 
their traditions situated in a determinate cultural space and time, though these traditions 
will also be various subspecies of the wider and long-lived tradition we call the Western 
tradition. In our specific case, the circumstances would be those of the constitutional 
democracies under conditions of modernity. We rely on a consensus in such commu-
nities though the shared considered convictions need not be, and typically will not 
be, only the shared convictions — the considered judgments — of those communities. 
They might in some instances be quite pan-human. But for them to be our considered 
judgments they must rest on a rough consensus in our family of communities of 
constitutional democracies and this, of course, implies some rough agreement at least 
in those communities. This agreement (consensus) is not an agreement, a contract, 
the sort of thing contractarians talk about. Unanimity is not even expected let alone 
required. It is just the kind of agreement that goes with, is, I suspect, the same thing 
as, a rough consensus. Moreover, this is not to assume with Barry that principles of 
justice are the objects of a collective choice or contract. It steps out, as much as 
Kymlicka does, of the contractarian tradition entirely. But it does require for moral 
reasoning even to proceed some rough consensus. As Peirce argued against Descartes, 
and Wittgenstein could have, if we have no place to start as social creatures with a 
battery of beliefs, we cannot even start. Put alternatively, we must see things by our 
own lights — irreducibly social lights — but we can, and indeed should, if we are 
reasonable, repair the ship at sea. For starters, there are no other lights we could see 
things by. But this does not conceptually imprison us, for we can reflect and think 
and question our beliefs, and indeed should where there is the real irritation of doubt. 
Moreover, our repairing the ship at sea will not be holus-bolus but a plank here and 
a plank there, bit by bit, but almost constantly repairing what will again and again 
be in need of repair. As Peirce and Dewey saw, it is not in Cartesian doubting, but 
it is in such circumstances, with such repairing and bootstrapping, where critical 
intelligence is displayed. Thus {pace Kymlicka) agreement (consensus) enters in at a 
very fundamental level indeed. To show that his impartiality account of justice is 
justified he must show that its principles and claims can, relying on considered 
judgments, be placed in wide reflective equilibrium. But still they must be our consi-
dered judgments and thus there must be a rough consensus. But this need not mean 
that it appeals to an agreement (a contract) or to the agreement of everyone to whom 
it is addressed. There is no reason to believe that we can get such an agreement, that 
we can get such an Archimedean point, but there is also good reason to think that 
we can avoid both ethnocentrism and authoritarianism here with such a rough consensus 
and without an Archimedean point. We avoid ethnocentrism by our means of correcting 
our intuitions ; we avoid authoritarianism by the democracy of consensus rooted in 
impartial and informed deliberation. 
Some philosophers appealing to wide reflective equilibrium and in doing so relying 
very fundamentally on considered convictions — Rawls most prominently — are also 
constructivists and contractarians and take the method of wide reflective equilibrium 
and contractarianism to form a coherent mutually reinforcing whole. For Rawls, for 
example, in deciding on how thick the veil of ignorance is to be or how the original 
position is to be characterized, we at crucial junctures rely on considered convictions 
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as we do in deciding on what it is reasonable to accept. But in turn in deciding on 
whether we have for a time achieved a wide reflective equilibrium — there is never 
anything like a timeless wide reflective equilibrium — we would need a conception 
of justice which would be acceptable to the parties under certain idealized conditions. 
So again at a very fundamental justificatory level agreement is appealed to. But, I 
shall say again, it is not an agreement, the contract, hypothetical or otherwise, of a 
contractarian, Rawls to the contrary notwithstanding, but rough consensus. It isn't 
that the substantive principles and claims of social justice are not what Kymlicka says 
they are — that they don't have that content and scope — or that justice is what we 
can agree on in certain idealized situations, but that, if we are to show that Kymlicka's 
or anyone else's substantive claims of justice are justified, we must show that there 
is such agreement (such a rough consensus) about what they are and how they stand 
together. But this (pace Rawls and Barry) does not require or even need contracta-
rianism. And we do not mean by "justice" what we would agree on in such situations 
and, in addition, this is not what justice is. But we can only be confident that our 
claims about what justice is are justified if they are rooted in such a consensus. 
We should note in this context that justice is significantly like truth. Truth is not 
what researchers investigating under ideal conditions and over a considerable time 
would agree is the case. But that may be the best test for truth. Similarly justice is 
not what would be agreed to or on in the original position, but that may be the best 
test for what is just. We have carefully to distinguish what truth and justice mean and 
what they are from how we ascertain what is true or just. 
VI 
I want now to consider a way, though a rather partial way, in which the impartiality 
approach to justice and the mutual advantage approach might be shown to be compa-
tible, while not being competing, compatible, or even congruently partial conceptions 
of justice. The impartiality approaches show us what justice is, how we have to be 
to be just persons of moral principle, what just institutions would look like and what 
principles of justice people, reasoning carefully from the moral point of view, would 
find during some epoch, and for some determinate culture or cluster of cultures, to 
be most justified and why. We are asking for moral reasons here which only per 
accidens may sometimes also be reasons of self-interest. Assuming there is something 
called the moral point of view (one element of which is the impartial consideration 
of the interests of all) people of moral principle will reason in accordance with it. 
They will hope, and reasonably expect, that most of the time their interests will not 
be hurt by doing so, but they will not think they are justified in doing so only when 
doing so answers (directly or indirectly) to their own interests or at least does not go 
against their interests. Their motive for pursuing justice is not the pursuit of individual 
advantage or even mutual advantage. What happens to other people matters in and of 
itself whatever the upshot for mutual advantage. But we can still ask, and they can 
ask, why be just ? This question cannot be asked from inside the moral point of view ; 
if we are to be persons of moral principle, and not merely persons of good morals, 
526 
JUSTICE AS A KIND OF IMPARTIALITY 
we have no alternative but to try to be just. Suppose, however, someone does not 
aspire to be a person of moral principle, does not care about rendering justice simply 
because of what it is. Such an amoralist can still perfectly intelligibly ask if justice 
pays, if he ought (prudentially ought) to do what just people do in order to improve 
his prospects or at least to protect his interests ? In that way, as a good prudential 
question, he can ask, stepping out of morality, so to speak, why be just. 
Can we give good reasons of a broadly prudential sort which will show why, or 
even that, a purely self-interested person, if through and through rational, and clear 
about the facts, will do, though out of self-interest, what a just person will do ? Kant, 
as we have seen, distinguished between a man of good morals (something an egoist 
could be) and a morally good man (someone genuinely committed to the moral point 
of view). Can we show that rational, purely self-interested people, if they were also 
persons of good morals, would, if they were through and through rational, do what 
just people do, or even do roughly what just people do, though not, of course, for the 
same reasons ? We should recognize in pressing that question, that "Why ought we 
to be just ?", "Why be fair ?", "Why ought we to do what is right ? or "Why should 
we be moral ?" are questions that we could not coherently ask from a moral point of 
view. To so ask them from that point of view is like asking "Why ought we do what 
we ought to do ?"37 
However, as the extended discussion of "Why be moral ?" has brought out, we 
can intelligibly ask : why take the moral point of view at all ?38 From the moral point 
of view, moral reasons by definition override non-moral reasons, but why take that 
point of view at all ? From the point of view of individual self-interest, from purely 
class interests or from the point of view of a group of constrained maximizers bent 
solely on cooperation for mutual advantage, moral reasons are not the overriding 
reasons, or at most they are only contingently overriding.39 From the moral point of 
view they are necessarily overriding but not from these points of view. But why take 
the moral point of view ? Justice, fairness and morality indeed require it. But so what ? 
Hobbesian theory can be taken as a powerful attempt to show that we (where 
"we" is taken collectively) have very strong prudential reasons for being, as the world 
is and will continue to be, men of good morals. We have in terms of long-term self-
interest the best of reasons to support the continued existence of some moral constraints, 
including some just practices. (We could not — logically could not — have moral 
institutions, at least where the circumstances of justice obtain, that did not include 
just social practices.) Rational persons, the claim goes, may not be morally good men 
but they will be men of good morals. 
37. Kai NIELSEN, Why be Moral? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989). 
38. Kurt BAIKR, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press. 1958) : William FRANKENA. 
Thinking about Morality (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1980): Kai NIELSEN, Why be 
Moral'/; and David GAUTHIER, éd.. Morality and Rational Self-Interest (Englewood Cliffs. NJ : Prentice-
Hall, 1970). 
39. Allen W. WOOD: "Marx's Immoralism" in Bernard CHAVANCE, éd.. Marx en Perspective (Paris: Éditions 
de l'École des Haute Études en Sciences Sociales, 1985), 681-698: "Justice and Class Interests," Philo-
sophica 3, (1984). 9-32. 
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The impartialist arguments, such as we have seen Barry, Kymlicka and Allen 
Buchanan articulating, show, I believe, that Hobbesians (pure mutual advantage theo-
rists) cannot get justice out of purely self-interested reasoning, including constrained 
maximization, which in the end is itself purely self-interested reasoning.40 Indeed, it 
is true, as some modern Hobbesians have powerfully argued, that people can expect 
to advance their interests most effectively by cooperating and in doing this by agreeing 
to accept certain constraints on their direct individual utility maximization. By mode-
rating their demands and by cooperating with others they will, as the world goes, in 
the long run do better. David Gauthier makes a powerful case for that. But these forms 
of cooperation will not give us morality, will not give us a system of justice, where 
the interests of all count equally, where what happens to other people, no matter how 
they are placed or how enfeebled, matters in and of itself and where the reasons for 
action must not just be acceptable from the point of view of the agent doing the 
reasoning but from all points of view. For a social practice to be just, it must not only 
answer to the interests of some individual or some class or some elite but it must 
answer to the interests of all, including those incapable of entering into relations of 
mutual advantage or of any kind of reciprocal relations. But, as we have seen, there 
can be all kinds of situations (class differentials, gender differences, caste systems, 
hierarchical strata, adults and children, mental compétents and mental defectives, 
developed cultures and non-literate ones) where there are differential power structures 
and where by pursuing mutual advantage intelligently in certain circumstances the 
powerful would exploit the weak and not for all of that be acting unintelligently. It 
could, as we have seen, very well in some of these circumstances be in the mutual 
advantage of everyone involved. But so acting would be unjust all the same. Justice 
cannot allow differential bargaining power to be translated into advantage. People in 
such circumstances, given their weakness, have reason to cooperate with the strong 
for otherwise they will be still worse off. And in societies as we know them these 
circumstances are not infrequent. So, given the differential power situation and the 
determination of the powerful to do the best they can for themselves, the weak have 
prudential reasons to cooperate even though they are exploited, indeed even severely 
exploited. But they are not in such a circumstance being treated justly : the resulting 
system of cooperation though rational is unjust. Indeed such treatment of people is 
immoral. We do not get to morality from Hobbesian premises and thus we do not get 
to justice. The impartialist does not ask why be just but shows what justice Is ; the 
Hobbesian asks why be just and tries to show that we should, prudentially speaking, 
be just because justice pays. What has been shown is (a) that paying does not make 
something just and (b) that it is not true that justice always pays. Some form of social 
cooperation always pays but the form of social cooperation people engage in, including 
mutually advantageous social cooperation, may be very different from justice. We 
may have a society or, at the extreme, a world, where there is mutually advantageous 
social cooperation which is still a society or even a world which is grossly unjust. 
40. Gauthier remarks "(•••! my discussion assumes rational, utility-maximizing individuals who are not mistaken 
about the nature of morality or. more generally, who recognize that the sole rationale for constraint must 
be ultimately a utility-maximizing one." GAUTHIER, "Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Represen-
tation," Social Philosophy and Policy 5, issue 2 (Spring 1988), 182. 
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The impartialist has not shown that an enlightened egoist or an intelligent and informed 
constrained maximizer must, to be through and through rational, be just. And the 
Hobbesian has not shown that we can get justice out of enlightened egoism in the 
circumstances of justice. 
To this the Hobbesian might reply that a good bit of morality is irrational. (Here 
we return, but now from a different angle, to something we considered earlier.) He 
may say, as David Gauthier does, that "traditional morality as such may be no more 
than a ragbag of views lacking any single, coherent rationale."41 The moral point of 
view requires the equal consideration of interests but, the Hobbesian would claim, it 
is irrational for an individual or a group to do so when it isn't in their own interests. 
What is rational to do is determined by the interests of the individual who is acting. 
Where parts of morality do not so answer to individual interests they should, the 
Hobbesian can claim, be jettisoned, and what is kept as a system of social cooperation, 
though considerably less than morality as it has been traditionally conceived, is the 
critical rational core of morality. That is all we should keep of the moral point of 
view. 
This purely instrumentalist conception of rationality, as we saw Barry arguing, 
rests on pure assertion. That it is just this that rationality comes to is not established 
through an examination of the use of "rationality." To give equal weight to the interests 
of all, as I argued, is not irrational. But to say that it is a rational thing to do is no 
more or no less rooted in the use of "rational" than is the claim that to be rational 
is always to give self-interested reasons pride of place.42 We can try to appeal to 
theoretical considerations to support such a Hobbesian instrumentalist conception of 
rationality, and its linked reduced form of morality : what in reality is more likely a 
streamlined replacement of morality. But there are other conceptions of rationality 
answering to different theoretical purposes. Given Hobbesian purposes we can use 
that Hobbesian conception of rationality, but, given Habermasian or Aristotelian pur-
poses or the purposes of impartialism, we can use instead these quite different concep-
tions of rationality. There may be no good reasons, external to these particular purposes 
and systems of the organization of things, to accept one of these purposes rather than 
another. Rather it may be the purposes themselves, and the problem solving activity 
that goes with their achievement, that determines, and displays, respectively, what is 
rational to do. There may be no Oxford Science telling us what rationality is. But to 
say that the Hobbesian ones are the really rational ones is plainly question begging. 
Moreover, the Hobbesian conception is subject to reductio arguments. If it fits the 
interests of one class to enslave another class and work them to the edge of starvation 
that would, on such a Hobbesian account, not only be what reason permits, it would, 
for them, be what both reason and justice require. But a theory of rationality which 
had that implication would not only be morally repugnant, it would be groundless and 
thoroughly implausible. 
41. David GAUTHIER, Moral Dealing, 270. 
42. Kai NIELSEN, "Can there be Justified Philosophical Beliefs?" lyyun 40 (July 1991), 235-70. 
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